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Abstract— Image sensors are generating limitless digital 
images every day. Image forgery like splicing and copy-move 
are very common type of attacks that are easy to execute using 
sophisticated photo editing tools. As a result, digital forensics 
has attracted much attention to identify such tampering on 
digital images. In this paper, a passive (blind) image tampering 
identification method based on Discrete Cosine Transformation 
(DCT) and Local Binary Pattern (LBP) has been proposed. 
First, the chroma components of an image is divided into fixed 
sized non-overlapping blocks and 2D block DCT is applied to 
identify the changes due to forgery in local frequency 
distribution of the image. Then a texture descriptor, LBP is 
applied on the magnitude component of the 2D-DCT array to 
enhance the artifacts introduced by the tampering operation. 
The resulting LBP image is again divided into non-overlapping 
blocks. Finally, summations of corresponding inter-cell values 
of all the LBP blocks are computed and arranged as a feature 
vector. These features are fed into a Support Vector Machine 
(SVM) with Radial Basis Function (RBF) as kernel to 
distinguish forged images from authentic ones. The proposed 
method has been experimented extensively on three publicly 
available well-known image splicing and copy-move detection 
benchmark datasets of color images. Results demonstrate the 
superiority of the proposed method over recently proposed 
state-of-the-art approaches in terms of well accepted 
performance metrics such as accuracy, area under ROC curve 
and others. 
Keywords— Digital forensics, splicing attack, copy-move 
attack, chroma components, Discrete Cosine Transformation, 
Local Binary Pattern, Support Vector Machine. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Internet of Things (IoT) objects have been an integrated 
part in today’s digital life. According to Ericsson Mobility 
Report on June 2018 [1], there will be 31.4 billion connected 
devices by 2023, which turns out to be approximately four 
devices per person breathing on planet earth. We are 
connecting our everyday smart objects such as smart vehicles, 
home appliances, security devices, wearable sensors, visual 
sensors, etc. to the Internet. A large number of sensors among 
those are visual sensors which play an important role in the 
cyberspace as well as physical security and surveillance. 
Again, modern social media like Instagram, Snapchat and 
Facebook as well as electronic news media are generating 
millions of digital images every day. People tend to rely and 
trust on these image data generated by these visual sensors and 
online media. However, specialized digital photo editing 
software and tools have made it quite easy to tamper images 
and thus anyone can easily generate fake images that look very 
much natural and authentic. Human visual system cannot 
identify any trace of forgery within these images. Spreading 
negative propaganda, hiding the actual facts, confusion in 
decision making process have become more common in 
modern media as a result of image forgery. Among all possible 
image forgery techniques, splicing and copy-move are the 
most well-known and commonly used attacks on images [2]. 
In image splicing, one or more portions of an image are copied 
and then pasted on another image. On the other hand, in copy-
move attack, one or more portions of an image are copied and 
then pasted on a different part of the same image.  
A single image can describe a complex idea easily. 
Therefore, an artificially tampered image may give a totally 
opposite or different impression and produce quite disturbing 
consequences [3, 4]. Photojournalist Markus Schreiber took 
the picture in Fig. 1(a) on the very first day of the 2017 G-20 
summit, Germany [5]. Later this picture was modified and 
uploaded to social media by a Russian journalist [6], which 
created a huge rumour and confusion across the world. 
Similarly, a tampered image could affect the decisions that are 
mainly based on digital image information. 
 
  
(a) Authentic image (b) Spliced image 
Fig. 1. Image splicing example 
Although digital image forgery does not leave any clue to 
the naked eyes, they can be detected through digital forensics. 
There exist different methodologies in literature for 
identifying image tampering. They can be grouped into two 
broad categories: active [7, 8] and passive (blind) [9, 10]. 
Active methods implant a unique signature or digital 
watermark into the source image. It is done mostly by the 
image sensor or camera while capturing the image. The 
receiver of the image verifies its authenticity by checking the 
signature or watermark. But majority of the image sensors 
available for consumers are cost effective and run on low 
resources for which they are not so capable of applying digital 
signature and watermarking techniques [11, 12]. Therefore, 
active methods have limited applications. However, passive 
(blind) approaches do not require such prior knowledge and 
hence attract much attention in digital image forgery detection 
in recent years. The key idea behind the blind detection 
approach is that image splicing and copy-move attacks 
introduce such artifacts which cannot be identified by human 
eyes but still they leave some footprints by altering statistical 
and structural properties of the image. To be precise, splicing 
and copy-move attacks introduces unexpected changes and 
micro-patterns along the pasted region boundary. We can 
consider these tampering artifacts as noise inserted into clear 
signal and thus identify them.          
Even though there are many image tamper detection 
techniques available in the current literature, further 
improvements in accuracy is needed for reliable forgery 
detection. In this paper, we propose a passive detection 
method using discrete cosine transformation (DCT) and local 
binary pattern (LBP) for detecting splicing and copy-move 
tampering from the chroma channels of an input image. 
Firstly, we identify the tampering artifacts in frequency 
domain by applying 2-D block DCT on image chroma 
channels. Secondly, LBP operator is used to enhance these 
artifacts. In order to propagate the changes introduced by 
image forgery, we extract the features from the blocks of LBP 
image by summing up the relevant inter-cell values. Finally, 
to classify the images as authentic or tampered, these features 
are fed into a support vector machine (SVM). Our proposed 
method outperforms many popular and contemporary 
methods in terms of classification accuracy produced by three 
benchmark datasets. This is mainly for the use of the new 
features and the order of the application of DCT and LBP. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
reports the related works. Section III explains our proposed 
method in detail. Section IV discusses the experimental result 
of our proposed method. It also compares our method with 
existing methods. Finally, Section V concludes the article. 
 
II. RELATED WORKS 
The rapid growth of camera technology and image sensors 
are the reason for billions of images being generated every 
month. Consequently, image forgery has also been increased 
dramatically. Researchers are continuously making efforts on 
detecting image forgery and thus they have proposed different 
approaches in recent years. In the following subsection, we 
mention some of the promising methods proposed by different 
researchers. All of them differ mainly based on the approach 
they adopt to model the structural and statistical changes in 
forged images. Most of the methods reported below utilized 
SVM for learning and classification. 
Johnson and Farid [13] proposed a method for identifying 
tampered image using the inconsistency in lighting conditions 
within the image. But their method does not work well if the 
host image and the image from where the forged portion is 
taken are under similar lighting conditions. In [14], Hsu and 
Chang proposed a method for splicing detection using 
geometry invariants and camera response function. However, 
their method is semi-automatic because of user engagement in 
labelling suspicious region in the tampered image, which is 
unrealistic in real-time applications. Later, they improved the 
method by integrating automatic segmentation [15]. 
Researchers in [11, 16, 17] suggested run-length based 
techniques to detect image forgery. Dong et al. [16] used a 
run-length and edge statistics to detect splicing attacks with 
76.52% accuracy for Columbia gray dataset [18]. Later on, He 
et al. [17] improved the accuracy (80.58%), computational 
cost and reduced the feature dimensionality of this method. In 
[11], Zhao et al. proposed a method where features were 
extracted from de-correlated chroma channels and four gray 
level run-length run-number (RLRN) vectors with different 
directions. They found that RLRN performed better in chroma 
space than in RGB or luminance space for detecting image 
splicing. An accuracy of 85% on Columbia color dataset [14] 
and 94.7% on CASIA 1 dataset [19] were reported. 
Shi et al. [20] introduced a method using statistical 
moment features and Markov features extracted from both 
pixel domain and frequency (multi-block DCT coefficients) 
domain. They improved the moment features that have been 
already used for steganalysis [21] in their previous research. 
He et al. [22] enhanced this method by extracting the Markov 
features from both DCT and DWT frequency domains. Unlike 
[20], they considered both intra-block and inter-block 
correlation among DCT coefficients and also discarded all 
moment based features. The main problem of these two 
methods ([20] and [22]) is that their detection accuracies 
(84.86% and 89.76%) are not good enough for CASIA 2 
dataset [23], a more challenging dataset in nature [19]. Wang 
et al. [24] proposed a method by modelling the edge 
information of an image in chroma space as a finite-state 
Markov chain and used its stationary distribution as features. 
They achieved higher detection accuracy (95.6%) for CASIA 
2 dataset than that of [20] and [22]. 
Some researchers utilized texture descriptors like Weber 
Local Descriptor (WLD) and LBP to model image tampering 
artifacts. In [25], Hussain et al. compared multiscale WLD 
with multiscale LBP. They achieved better result using WLD 
(94.29% for splicing, 90.97% for copy-move) than using LBP 
(90.48% splicing and 85.83% for copy-move) on CASIA 1 
dataset. In another work by Hussain et al. [26], features were 
extracted using multi-resolution WLD from the chroma 
component of images and reported 93.33% detection accuracy 
for splicing attacks and 91.52% detection accuracy for copy-
move attacks over CASIA 1. Muhammad et al. [27] applied 
steerable pyramid transform (STP) on the chroma components 
of image and then calculated LBP histogram to generate 
features. They achieved 94.89%, 97.33% and 96.39% 
detection accuracy on CASIA 1, CASIA 2 and Columbia color 
dataset respectively. 
Zhang et al. [28] and Alahmadi et al. [12] used DCT and 
LBP, however the order of DCT and LBP application on 
image blocks, the color space of image and feature extraction 
techniques are different. Zhang et al. [28] applied LBP 
operator on the magnitude of 2D-DCT coefficient of the gray 
image blocks, and used the histogram to generate features. In 
contrast, Alahmadi et al. [12] applied LBP operator on non-
overlapping blocks of chrominance channels followed by 2D-
DCT transformation. They used the standard deviation based 
features calculated using the corresponding DCT coefficients. 
The accuracy of both methods appears to be promising. To be 
precise, Alahmadi et al. found better detection accuracy using 
chrominance channel of an image. Many methods (e.g., [11, 
12, 29-31]) support the effectiveness of chrominance channels 
over illuminance channel for detecting image forgery artifacts. 
Inspired by the ability of chroma channels along with the 
efficacy of DCT and LBP operators to capture splicing and 
copy-move attacks, we propose a splicing and copy-move 
detection method using DCT, LBP and a different feature set 
calculated by an aggregation operator for color images. The 
proposed method is presented in the following section. 
 
III. PROPOSED METHOD 
Detecting splicing and copy-move attacks are binary 
decision problem – whether an image is altered or not. The 
forgery introduces both statistical and structural changes in an 
original image. It affects the extracted features of an image. 
Therefore, a number of techniques are required to apply on the 
image before deriving final features. These features are then 
fed into a classifier to identify fake images. The overall 
mechanism of the proposed method has been illustrated in Fig. 
2. In the following sections, we discuss our proposed method 
in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Proposed image splicing and copy-move detection system 
A. Converting images into YCbCr color space to extract 
Cb, Cr component 
We have implemented our system using three publicly 
available image splicing and copy-move detection datasets. 
All the images in the datasets are in RGB color space. Chroma 
components hold most of the tampering artifacts that human 
eyes cannot perceive. Therefore, we first convert them into 
YCbCr color space to extract the Cb and Cr components. 
Here, Y refers to luminance component while Cb is the 
difference between the blue component and a reference value, 
and Cr is the difference between the red component and a 
reference value [32, 33]. We used the following 
transformation formula to convert an RGB image into YCbCr 
color image [34]. 
[
𝑌
𝐶𝑏
𝐶𝑟
] = [
16
128
128
] + [
   65.481 128.553    24.966
−37.797 −74.203  112.000
112.000 −93.786 −18.214
] [
𝑅
𝐺
𝐵
]. 
B. Block division of input Chroma Component 
An image can be manipulated in different ways by splicing 
and copy-move attacks. Different image segments with 
different sizes may have been pasted on different part of the 
host image. In addition, the host image itself can be of 
different dimensions. As a result, different sized block 
division of the image is essential to correctly capture the 
forgery artifacts. In our proposed method, we divide the 
images into blocks in two phases and discuss the first phase in 
this section while the second phase is discussed in Section III-
E. In the first phase, we divide the chroma components (Cb 
and Cr) of the YCbCr color image into different block sizes. 
We have experimented our proposed method with different 
sizes of blocks: 4x4, 8x8 and 16x16 as well as combining 
features from all these blocks. We divide the chroma channels 
into blocks using the following procedure. Let 𝐶𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏  be a 
Cb or Cr channel of the input image of size 𝑤𝑏 × ℎ𝑏 pixels. 
We divide 𝐶𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏 into 𝑤 × ℎ non-overlapping blocks of size 
𝑏 × 𝑏 pixels. The resultant chroma component block 2D array 
is given by, 
 𝐶𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏 = ⌈
𝐶1,1
𝑏×𝑏 ⋯ 𝐶1,𝑤
𝑏×𝑏
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐶ℎ,1
𝑏×𝑏 ⋯ 𝐶ℎ,𝑤
𝑏×𝑏
⌉ . 
C. Block discrete cosine transformation (BDCT) 
Because of image forgery, unexpected changes and micro 
patterns are introduced along the tampered regions of an 
image. The splicing and copy-move attack disturbs the natural 
correlation between image pixels by altering regularity, 
smoothness, continuity of the tampered image and by 
changing the local frequency distribution of the affected areas 
[20]. It is also necessary to condense the diversity of the image 
content and enhance the tampering artifacts before extracting 
final features. To represent the degree of content change in a 
chroma component, it is converted from pixel domain to 
frequency domain using BDCT. BDCT shows encouraging 
performance in representing pixel domain changes in local 
frequency distribution because of its remarkable capability of 
pixel decorrelation and energy compaction properties [35]. 
We apply 2D-DCT on the blocks of 𝐶𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏 to generate DCT 
coefficients. Let 𝑌𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏  be the resultant transform domain 
coefficient after applying 2D-DCT on each block and it is 
given by, 
 𝑌𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏 = ⌈
𝑌1,1
𝑏×𝑏 ⋯ 𝑌1,𝑤
𝑏×𝑏
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑌ℎ,1
𝑏×𝑏 ⋯ 𝑌ℎ,𝑤
𝑏×𝑏
⌉ , 
where, 𝑌i,𝑗
𝑏×𝑏 = 2𝐷­𝐷𝐶𝑇(𝐶i,j
𝑏×𝑏), 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑤, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℎ . The 
2D-DCT of an input block 𝐶i,j
𝑏×𝑏  and output block 𝑌i,j
𝑏×𝑏  is 
given by, 
𝑌i,j
𝑏×𝑏(p, q) =
𝛼𝑝𝛼𝑞 ∑ ∑ 𝐶i,j
𝑏×𝑏(𝑚, 𝑛) cos
𝜋(2𝑚+1)𝑝
2𝑏
cos
𝜋(2𝑛+1)𝑞
2𝑏
 ,𝑏−1𝑛=0
𝑏−1
𝑚=0  
where, 0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑏 − 1, 0 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑏 − 1 and 
 𝛼𝑝 =
{
 
 √
1
𝑏
, if 𝑝 = 0
√
2
𝑏
, otherwise
  , 
 𝛼𝑞 =
{
 
 √
1
𝑏
, if 𝑞 = 0
√
2
𝑏
, otherwise 
 . 
D. Local binary pattern (LBP) operator 
We employ LBP operator on the magnitude component of 
𝑌𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏 in order to identify and enhance different splicing and 
copy-move artifacts. LBP is a robust and computationally 
inexpensive texture descriptor. We adopt LBP in our system 
mainly to identify the occurrences of micro-patterns in the 
forged images. LBP highlights these forgery artifacts and 
augment them in the host image. In LBP, every pixel value of 
a given 2D array is compared with its neighbouring pixel 
values and an LBP code is generated for that pixel. Note, in 
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our proposed system, we apply LBP operator on the DCT 
coefficients of an image and hence it is calculated as below:   
Let 𝐿𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏  be the resultant LBP array generated by 
applying LBP operator on magnitude components of 𝑌𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏 . 
It is given by, 
 𝐿𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏 = 𝐿𝐵𝑃𝑁,𝑅(|𝑌
𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏|) , 
 𝐿𝐵𝑃𝑁,𝑅 = ∑ 𝑔(𝑝𝑛 − 𝑝𝑐)2
𝑛𝑁−1
𝑛=0  . 
where 𝑁 , 𝑅  and 𝑝𝑐  represent the number of neighbor DCT 
coefficients, the radius and the central DCT coefficient, 
respectively. The neighbouring DCT coefficient is defined as 
𝑝𝑛  where 𝑛 = 0,1, … , 𝑁 − 1 . The function 𝑔(𝑝𝑛 − 𝑝𝑐)  is 
defined as, 
 𝑔(𝑝𝑛 − 𝑝𝑐) = {
1, 𝑝𝑛 − 𝑝𝑐 ≥ 0
0, 𝑝𝑛 − 𝑝𝑐 < 0
 . 
In our proposed system, we use the basic LBP where the 
values are calculated in a rectangular window. Here, we 
choose 𝑁 = 8  and 𝑅 = 1 . Therefore, the central DCT 
coefficient 𝑝𝑐  compares its own value with neighbouring 8 
DCT coefficients. If the central DCT coefficient’s value is 
equal or smaller than the neighbouring DCT coefficient’s 
value, then 1 is recorded; otherwise 0 is recorded. Based on 
these assessments, central DCT coefficient 𝑝𝑐 generates an 8-
bit binary code and converts it to a decimal number to stores 
as its own LBP code. We explain the process with an example 
in Figure 3. Here, we take a sample segment from the 
magnitude component of 𝑌𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏  and calculate LBP. The 
binary values are obtained by comparing the central DCT 
coefficient 𝑝𝑐 with its 8 neighboring DCT coefficients. Then 
the 8-bit binary digit is formed starting from Least Significant 
Bit (LSB) to Most Significant Bit (MSB). Finally, the binary 
number is converted to decimal number and LBP code 
replaces the DCT coefficient value of central DCT coefficient 
𝑝𝑐. 
 
 
Fig. 3. LBP code generation procedure 
 
E. Block division of LBP image 
This is the second and final phase of block division where 
we divide the LBP 2D array 𝐿𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏  into same size of blocks, 
similar to the block division operation performed in Section 
III-B. We divide 𝐿𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏  into 𝑤 × ℎ non-overlapping blocks 
of size 𝑏 × 𝑏 LBP codes. The resultant block 2D array of LBP 
is represented as, 
 𝐿𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏 = ⌈
𝐿1,1
𝑏×𝑏 ⋯ 𝐿1,𝑤
𝑏×𝑏
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐿ℎ,1
𝑏×𝑏 ⋯ 𝐿ℎ,𝑤
𝑏×𝑏
⌉ . 
F. Feature extraction 
DCT has the capabilities of representing changes among 
pixel values of an input chroma component by transforming it 
from spatial domain to frequency domain. A forged image 
may have higher and more non-zero values of high frequency 
DCT coefficients depending on the degree of change in that 
image. In the proposed method, the features are extracted by 
calculating the summation of corresponding inter-cell values 
of blocks of LBP codes. We adopt such approach in this 
specific order because, DCT coefficient capture the changes 
among pixel values in spatial domain by transforming it to 
frequency domain, while LBP enhances these changes and 
thus magnifies the forgery artifacts in higher frequency 
components. We need to preserve these local changes 
captured by LBP to make the forgery detection system 
efficient as much as possible. These local changes can be 
regarded as outlier since splicing and copy-move attacks 
usually introduce sophisticated changes in images. It is well 
known that mean is most affected by outliers than other 
statistical measures. The feature extraction technique in our 
proposed method is based on an aggregation operator (sum) 
which is similar to the mean based feature extraction 
technique. We implemented our proposed method with 
different block sizes as discussed in Section III-B and Section 
III-E. The features in our proposed method are derived as 
below: 
Let 𝑍𝑘
𝑤×ℎ  be the 𝑘-th LBP code values of all blocks in 
𝐿𝑤𝑏×ℎ𝑏 . Therefore, 
     𝑍𝑘
𝑤×ℎ = [
𝐿1,1
𝑏×𝑏(𝑘) ⋯ 𝐿1,𝑤
𝑏×𝑏(𝑘)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐿ℎ,1
𝑏×𝑏(𝑘) ⋯ 𝐿ℎ,𝑤
𝑏×𝑏(𝑘)
] ,   1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑏2 , 
where, 𝐿𝑢,𝑣
𝑏×𝑏(𝑘) is the 𝑘-th LBP code of that block. The 𝑘-th 
feature 𝐹𝑘 is derived as, 
 𝐹𝑘 = ∑ ∑ 𝐿𝑢,𝑣
𝑏×𝑏(𝑘)ℎ𝑣=1  .
𝑤
𝑢=1  

IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
A. Description of datasets 
For the evaluation of our proposed method, we have used 
three standard benchmark datasets for image splicing and 
copy-move attack detection: (i) Columbia Uncompressed 
Image Splicing Detection Evaluation Dataset (Columbia 
Color) [14], (ii) CASIA Tampered Image Detection 
Evaluation Database version 1.0 (CASIA TIDE v1.0) [19] and 
(iii) CASIA Tampered Image Detection Evaluation Database 
version 2.0 (CASIA TIDE v2.0) [23]. Among them, CASIA 2 
is the latest dataset that contains high resolution and color 
images of different types and resolutions. We agree with [22-
24] that CASIA 2 is the most realistic publicly available 
dataset having a large number of samples and thus, a robust 
splicing detection system should have higher accuracy on this 
dataset. The detailed information of these three datasets is 
shown in Table I. 
Image DCT Coefficients         
 
0.17 0.08 0.14  MSB 1 0 0   LBP Code 
0.09 0.17 0.21  LBP Operator LSB 0 - 1  10010010 
146 
0.29 0.14 0.11   1 0 0   
 TABLE I.  INFORMATION OF THE DATASETS USED IN EVALUATION 
Dataset Image Size  
Image 
Type 
No. of Images 
Tampering Method 
Authentic Tampered Total 
Columbia 
Color 
757 x 568 - 
1152 x 768 
TIF, 
BMP 
183 180 363 Simple crop-and-paste using Photoshop, No post processing 
CASIA 1 
384 x 256, 
256 x 384 
JPG 800 921 1721 Photoshop with pre-processing; No post-processing 
CASIA 2 
240 x 160 - 
900 x 600 
JPG, TIF, 
BMP 
7491 5123 12614 Photoshop with pre-processing and/or post-processing 
B. SVM Classifier and model validation 
In machine learning, SVM has been widely used as it 
shows promising performance in many well recognized 
applications of splicing and copy-move attack detection. We 
chose LIBSVM [36] as the classifier to evaluate the accuracy 
of the proposed system. Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel 
was selected for this work. The regularisation parameter (𝑐) 
and variance of RBF kernel (𝛾 ) were identified through a 
‘loose and fine’ grid-search method [37]. The performance of 
our method was evaluated using sixfold cross-validation. All 
the classification related tasks were performed in Weka 3.8.2 
[38]. We used MATLAB R2017b for feature extraction and 
data pre-processing related tasks. 
C. Results and discussion 
The detection accuracy for features derived from Cb 
component, Cr component and their combination has been 
summarized in Table II. All of them were tested for block size 
of 4x4, 8x8, 16x16 as well as their combination (4x4 + 8x8 + 
16x16). The detection accuracy increases along with an 
increase of block size. Therefore, use of 4x4 blocks produces 
the lowest accuracy, while combining the blocks results in the 
highest accuracy across different datasets. In terms of chroma 
components, we found the best result using Cb component in 
Columbia color dataset, while the best results were obtained 
when we combined both Cb and Cr component in CASIA 1 
and CASIA 2 datasets. The variations of detection accuracy in 
different chroma channels are observed in different datasets 
because of the nature of images [12]. For example, images in 
Columbia dataset were mostly taken in indoor conditions with 
exactly four specific models of cameras, whereas CASIA 1 
and CASIA 2 contain images that were taken both indoor and 
outdoor environment using different sources (e.g., Corel 
image dataset, websites, own camera sources).  The detection 
accuracy using Cb component, Cr component and their 
combination for each dataset varies between 1% ~ 2% 
approximately (Table II) which indicates that our proposed 
system is quite robust. Choosing either of the chroma 
components can provide satisfactory outcome. Overall, the 
proposed method achieves detection accuracy of 97.52%, 
97.79% and 99.82% over Columbia color, CASIA 1 and 
CASIA 2 dataset respectively. In addition to detection 
accuracy, we also determined precision, recall and AUC (Area 
Under ROC curve) of our method using Weka tool which are 
reported in Table II.  
D. Comparison with recent methods 
There are other methods for detecting splicing and copy-
move attacks found in existing literature as described in 
Section II. Among them, two existing methods ([28] and [12]) 
adopted both DCT and LBP in their systems and reported 
good detection accuracy. Zhang et al. [28] proposed their 
system using gray scale images while Alahmadi et al. [12] 
used color images. Since our proposed method is for detecting 
splicing and copy-move attacks in color images, we have 
implemented the latter one to compare thoroughly with our 
proposed system. Table III presents the comparison of our 
proposed method with Alahmadi et al.’s method using the 
combined Cb and Cr components for all three datasets 
mentioned in Section IV-A. The basic experimental setup 
remains the same as mentioned in Section IV-B.  
False Negative Rate (FNR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) 
are the two significant performance evaluation metrics for any 
image forgery detection system where FNR refers to the rate 
of erroneously classifying a tampered image as an authentic 
one (i.e., miss rate) and FPR means the rate of falsely 
classifying an authentic image as a tampered one which 
generates false alarm. From the forensic or security viewpoint, 
missing a tampered image has more severe consequences and 
thus a reliable detection system must produce as low FNR as 
possible. To assess the robustness and validity of our forgery 
detection method, the FNR should be significantly lower than 
existing methods. Table III shows that our proposed method 
produces 1.83% ~ 1.11% lower FNR than the existing method 
in [12]. In addition, our method performs better in terms of 
True Positive Rate (TPR), True Negative Rate (TNR) and 
AUC. For all three datasets, our method achieves better AUC 
([0.975, 0.977, 0.998] vs [0.967, 0.970, 0.976]), which is a 
more accepted metric considering performance in both 
classes. From Table III, it is clear that our method outperforms 
the method in [12] throughout all three datasets.   
TABLE II.  OVERALL DETECTION ACCURACY IN OUR PROPOSED METHOD WITH VARYING BLOCK SIZE AND DIFFERENT CHROMA COMPONENTS (CB, CR 
AND COMBINED CB+CR) 
Block 
Size 
Evaluation Columbia Color CASIA 1 CASIA 2 
Cb Cr Cb+Cr Cb Cr Cb+Cr Cb Cr Cb+Cr 
4x4 
 
Accuracy 92.287 89.532 93.113 83.217 86.247 87.995 99.207 99.215 99.247 
Precision 0.952 0.928 0.938 0.830 0.860 0.866 0.988 0.989 0.989 
Recall (TPR) 0.889 0.856 0.922 0.863 0.888 0.917 0.993 0.992 0.993 
AUC 0.923 0.895 0.931 0.830 0.861 0.877 0.992 0.992 0.993 
8x8 
 
Accuracy 96.143 94.490 95.041 94.173 95.047 95.571 99.429 99.350 99.516 
Precision 0.988 0.971 0.982 0.935 0.944 0.950 0.992 0.991 0.992 
Recall (TPR) 0.933 0.917 0.917 0.958 0.965 0.968 0.994 0.993 0.996 
AUC 0.961 0.945 0.950 0.941 0.949 0.955 0.994 0.993 0.995 
16x16 
 
Accuracy 97.245 94.490 95.317 95.047 96.911 97.028 99.715 99.715 99.730 
Precision 0.978 0.994 0.977 0.936 0.966 0.962 0.996 0.995 0.996 
Recall (TPR) 0.967 0.894 0.928 0.974 0.977 0.984 0.997 0.998 0.998 
AUC 0.972 0.944 0.953 0.949 0.968 0.969 0.997 0.997 0.997 
4x4 + 
8x8 + 
16x16 
Accuracy 97.521 94.766 95.592 96.154 97.727 97.786 99.786 99.786 99.818 
Precision 0.983 0.988 0.961 0.953 0.976 0.973 0.997 0.996 0.997 
Recall (TPR) 0.967 0.906 0.950 0.976 0.982 0.986 0.998 0.998 0.998 
AUC 0.975 0.947 0.956 0.960 0.977 0.977 0.998 0.998 0.998 
TABLE III.  COMPARISON BETWEEN PROPOSED METHOD AND METHOD 
IN [12] 
Dataset Evaluation Proposed 
Method 
Method in [12] 
Columbia Color Accuracy (%) 97.521 96.694 
FPR (%)  1.64 2.19 
FNR (%) 3.33 4.44 
TPR (%) 96.67 95.56 
TNR (%) 98.36 97.81 
AUC 0.975 0.967 
CASIA 1 Accuracy (%) 97.786 96.969 
FPR (%) 3.14 3.01 
FNR (%) 1.41 3.05 
TPR (%) 98.59 96.95 
TNR (%) 96.86 96.99 
AUC 0.977 0.970 
CASIA 2 Accuracy (%) 99.818 97.494 
FPR (%) 0.20 2.86 
FNR (%) 0.16 1.99 
TPR (%) 99.84 98.01 
TNR (%) 99.80 97.14 
AUC 0.998 0.976 
 
In addition to comparing our method with Alahmadi et 
al.’s method, Table IV depicts the comparison of detection 
accuracy among different existing methods across different 
datasets.  
TABLE IV.  COMPARISON OF DETECTION ACCURACY OF PROPOSED 
METHOD WITH OTHER EXISTING METHODS AS REPORTED BY AUTHORS 
Dataset 
Method 
Columbia 
Color 
CASIA 1 CASIA 2 
Accuracy (%) 
Proposed Method 97.52 97.79 99.82 
Alahmadi et al. [12] 96.69 96.97 97.49 
Muhammad et al. [27] 96.39 94.89 97.33 
Hussain et al. [25] 94.29 - - 
Zhao et al. [11] 85.00 94.70 - 
He et al. [22] - - 89.76 
Shi et al. [20]a  - - 84.86 
Zhang et al. [28]b  91.38 - - 
a. implemented by [22] 
b. implemented by [12] 
 Not all works have experimented with all three datasets 
mentioned above and therefore, here we only report results on 
the specific dataset(s) they reported. Table IV shows that our 
method outperforms existing state-of-the-art methods in all 
three benchmark datasets. To the best of our knowledge, the 
proposed method has achieved splicing and copy-move 
detection accuracy of up to 99.82%, the highest accuracy 
among all other methods available in the literature. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a robust model has been proposed for 
detecting splicing and copy-move attacks in color images 
using DCT and LBP operator. Chrominance components are 
affected more by these attacks than luminance component. 
DCT is used to capture the change in the local frequency 
distribution, while LBP is applied on the magnitude 
component of the DCT coefficients to detect the occurrences 
of micro-patterns and magnify the artifacts introduced by 
splicing and copy-move attacks. Finally, summation of 
relevant inter-cell LBP values are calculated to extract 
features. We used SVM with RBF kernel to classify the 
images into authentic and tampered ones. The detection 
results show that the proposed method is superior to the 
existing methods across different well known publicly 
available benchmark datasets for image forgery detection. 
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